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INTRODUCTION

Srat¿sTe/. dzTe/. Co. (1977);8

The author was chagrined to
discover that his most recent article
on "MontanaLaw and the Out-oÊ
State Policy" (Trial Trends, Âutumn
1998) is now rwelve years old when
the guiding cases u/ere otiy Kemþ u.
Allstate (1979)'z and Yoøngblood u.

DieTienne Assoc.

American States Ins. Co. (1993).3 The
Montana Supreme Court has since
issued at least seven opinions involving conflicts'of law and out-of-state
auto policies, and the decisions signal
change important to claimants' counsel. As late as 2007 in lVarnsley u.
Nodak Mataal Ins. Co.,a Justice Warner
complained in his dissent that the

court was virtually following a de
that, if an accident happened in Montana, the out-of-state insurance policy

Co of

.

An insurer is not entitled to
subrogation until the insured is
made whole including costs and
àttorney fees. Skaage u. Moantain
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u.

.
Mat

Hartford Ins.

.

An insurer mây not place a
provision in an insurance policy
that defeats coverage for which the
insurer has received valuable
consideration. Røckdascbel u. State
Farm Mutual Aøto. Ins. Co. (1,997)11
Bennett u. State Farn Mataal Aato
Montana's anti-stacking st¿tute is
unconsdrudonal for violation of
substantive due. process.

Harþ

u.

Progrusiue (2003).t3

.

The auto insurer ma)¿ not subiogate to recover benefits paid under
Medical Pay coverage. Allstate Ins.
Co. u. Reitler (1981).'zl

the M¿dwest Q002).10

[ns. Co. (1993).12

In Trial Trends articles entided
"Invaliclating r{uto Policy Provisions
in Montana" $X/inter 1.999) anð.
'Voiding Äuto Insurance clauses for
Violaung Public Policy" (Autumn
2004), the author identifi.ed over
twenty standard auto policy exclusions, conditions, or offsets that have
been declared invalid by the Montana

courts. Arguably, Mohtana Law provides some of the'strongest public
policy protections for auto insurânce
consumers in the'nation.

The tortfeasor's liability insurer
must advance medical expenses in
cases where liability is reasonably
clear Ndle1 u. Cøaranfl Natiorual lrus.

In nearþ

all cases, it is in the injured claimant's
interest to apply Montana law to the
out-of-state auto policy providing
coverage for a Montana auto accident.

Co. (1997).M

.

The tortfeasor's liability insuret
must advânce lost wages in cases
where liability is reasonably clear.
Døbrq a. Farrners Irus. Fxchange
(2001).,s

.

The insurcr may not offset against
Uninsured Motorist coverage
benefìts paid under the Bodily

Injury coverage. Swar¿son u. Haøþrd
Ins. Co. of tbe Midwest (2002),16

\ùØhcther Montana law appJies to

an out-of-state policy involved in an
accident in Montana is critical, because Montana has well-developed
common law for protection of auto
insurance consumers thát other states
generally lack. Consider, for example,
just these few Montana rules and
their case precedents:

Farmers tJnion

Ins. (1,994)l Swanson

had to be interpreted according to
Montana law. After the same court's
subsequent decisions in Moodro u.
Nationwide Matual Fire Ins. Co. (2008),s
Tinas u. Progresiue Preferred Ins. Co.
(2008)6 and Tacker u. Farmers Insurance
Exch a nge (2009),7 Jus rice \ùTarner
would make no such charge. A sea
change is underway in how the court
determines which law applies to outof-state policies, and that change
will make for tougher sailing for
claimants.

u.

1

Mitchell u. State Farru Insørance
Cornþary Q003),17
siue Q003).18

.

Harþ

u. Progres

The auto insurer may not demand

in reasonably clear
liabiliry cases involving minimum
lirnits of insurance. lYalters u.
a release

Gaaranfl National Ins. Co. (2000).1e

'

The "{ami7y exclusion" clause in
Bodily Injury coverage is invalid as
against pub,lic poJicy. Transanerica
Ins. Co. u. Roltle (1983).'z0

Kemp a. Allstate Q979)z Applr,rng
the Statutory "Place of Perfor- "
mancett Test Absent,a Choice.ofLaw Provision
In the 1998 article on the out-ofstate policy, I noted that the courts
around the nation,had previously

established a general rule, that auto
insurance policies were governed by
the law of the place in which the
contfact was made,22 However, the
Montana Supreme Court had purported to reject ¡þs ÍÍrn6ds¡n ¿p-:
proach"z3 which appJigd to'auto

insurance contracts the'law of .the
state having the "most significant
relationship" to the i$sue to be decided. \Øhïe rejecting what it described as the "revisionisC'?a modern
approach, the Montana Supreme
Court used a "place of performance"
test that resulted in appþing Montana

law to out-of-state policies involved
in accidents in Montana.

P¡rcn 2l

This could be {ìrst seen in the
seminal and nationally noted case of
Kenp u. Allstate in 1979. Julie l(emp, a
resident of New York, was a passenger in an auto garaged in Vermont
when she was struck and killed in
Butte, Montanalry an auto driven by
aMontana resident. The car in which
I(emp rode was insured with Allstate
in Vermont and driven by her grandfather, a Vermont resident. In all,
I(emp was an "insured" for Uninsured Motorist coverage under a
Vermont policy covering two autos
of her grandparents with whom she
rode and an Allstate policy covering
three autos of her parents in New
York. Both policies involving separate premiums for each auto they
covered. Montana allowed stacking
of the Uninsured Motorist coverage

of

such poJicies while:Vermont and

New York law prohibited stacking.
Neither of the poJicies contained a
choice-of-law piovision.
The Montana Supreme Court
declined to adopt what the justices
termed the "revisionist" approach of
the Restatement of Conflicts $ 6
which would require the court to
analyze the contract to see which
state had "the.most significant rela-

The court noted three parts of
the Allstate policies that indicated
place of performance:
First, the basic insuring agreement promised "to pay all sums
which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entided to
recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury. . . including death . . . sustained by the
insuted, caused by accident arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or
use, of such uninsured automobile."
Second, the territorial coverage agreement provided coverage within the

United States which agreement the
court found to contemplâte payment

in any state where the insured was
liable. Third, the stanclard "payment
of loss" ptovision would result in
payment of the Silver Bow Counry
judgment being made to the
deceased's representative in that court
in Montana, the judgment having

tionship with the parties, the transaction or the occurrence with regarå
to the issues in dispute." The court
elected instead to follov¡ the Montana
statute governing choice-of-law for
contracts concluding that "place

been made final.
Consequently, the. court concluded that the place of performance
was Montana so that the policy would
be construed uncler Montana law to
allow stacking of the UM coverages.
As a conflicts-of-law holding, this
was gratifying to claimants' counsel
in Montana because the standard
policy provisions and the factors the
court noted v¡ould likely be present in
almost any accident case involving an
out-of-state auto. Hence, absent a

of performance" and not place
of execution governed:

choice-of-law provision, one could
predict that Montana law would apply

in such
MCA 528-3-102 - Vhat
law and usage to govern
interpretation
A contrâct is to be interpreted
according to the law and usage
of the place where it is to be
performed; or, if it does not
indicate aplace of performance, according to the law
and usage of the place where
it is made.

Prcn 22

cases.

Youngblood ø. American Stdtes
(1993): Rejecting an Oregon
Choice-of-Law Provision as
Against Montana Public Policy
The case of Yoøngblood u. American
State¡ Ins. Co. in 1.993 involved an
Oregon auto poJicy that contained a
choice-of-law provision that the
Montana Supreme Court found "expresses the intention of the parties to
apply Oregon law no m^tter where

the acciclent occurred or where the
contract is to be performed."" The
court coflceded that an unambiguous
choice-of-law provision had to be
enforced unless it was against
Montana pubtic policy.
However, at issue in Youngblood
was the subrogatìon clause in the
Medical Pay coverage of the Oregon
poJicy under which
States
'\merican
wanted to recovef amounts paid from
any money the tortfeasor paid its
injurecl insured. Oregon allowed such
subrogation, but Montana law forbade it as against public policy under
Allstate Ins. Co. u. Reitler (1.981).26
Plaintiff father and daughter were
residents of Oregon and lØashington
respectively. The auto was apparendy
garaged in Oregon and the policy
issued in Oregon. The accident happened in Montana. The question,
then, was whether Montana or
Oregon law would control the issue.
The Yoangb/ood court noted that,
in general, "[Ilh" law of the place of

petformance controls legal construction and effect, while the law of the
place where the contract is made
governs on questions of execution
and validity."27 As in l(emp, the court
found dispositive the fact that the
general policy language required
American States to pay whatever
damages were required in Montana,
so that the contract was deemed to
be performed in Montana.
However, the coutt conceded
that the policy's choice-of-law provi-

if not ambiguous, would have
to be enforced unless it violated
public policy. The court then found
sion,

that the medical pay subrogation

provision violated Montana public
policy, which prohibited such subrogation, and refused to enforce it.28
Hence, the court established that a
choice-of-law provision in the insurance policy could determine place of
performance and require application
of another state's law to govern
policy interpretation. However, if
application of that state's law would

Tnr¡r TnBNos - AururvrN
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give effect to a provision void as
against public policy under Montana
laq a Montana col)rt could tefuse to
enforce it.
Hence, I(emþ meant that, absent a
choice-oÊlaw provision, the policy
would be governed by "place of
performance," which, under the standard basic insuring agreement and
standard provisions for territorial
coverage and payment of loss, would
Jikely be the place where the accident
happened. Yoøngblood meant that a
choice-of-law provision would govern which state's law applied but
could not force a Montana court to
enforce a provision void as against
Montana's public policy.
Swanson a. Hartford (2002):

Following Youngblood and Rejecting a Colotado Choice-of-Law
Provision as Against Montana
Public Policy
In Swanson u. Harford lrus. of the
Midwest Q002),2e the Montana Supreme Court âccepted certification
from the federal court of issues involved when a Colorado insutance
policy applied to an accident in Montana. The Swansons, who resided
both in Montana and in Colorado
during any given year, \¡/ere severely
injured in a collision with a USF/
Reddaway tràctor-tra:tfer at Ravalli,

Montana. They incurred over $50,000
in medical experrses in Montana,
which they submitted under their
policy issued in Colorado. The Colorado "no-fault" policy contained PIP,
"personal injury, protection" that

covered medical expenses with a

subrogation clause giving the carrier
the right to recover any payments
made undet PIP from any third party
regardless of whether the insured has
been "made whole." Importantly, the
policy also contained a "choice of
lau/' provision stating disputes would
be governed by Colorado law.

Hartford asserted its subrogation
with Continental, the insurer for
USF/Reddaway, causing Continental

to put Hartford's name on a $26,000
check for advance medicals. Hartford
held the check and refused to endorse
it for fifteen months until Swansons
sued for bacl faith. The case was
removed to fedetal court, v/hich certifìed to the Montana Supreme Court
questions of: (1) whether medical pay
subrogation is against public policy in
Montana; (2) whether the "madewhole" doctrine is public policy in
Montana regatdless of policy language to the contrary; and (3)
whether a Colotado "choice of lav/'
provision violates Montana Public
Policy if Colorado law allows subrogation regardless of whether the
insured has been made whole.
The Montana Supreme Court
held that "[i]t is public policy in
Moritana that an insured must be
totally reimbursed for all losses as
well as costs, including attorncy fccs,
involved in tec'overing those losses
before the insurer can cxcrcisc any
right of subrogation regatdless of
contract language to the contrary."
It then followecl Yoangblood in
fìrst recognizing that it must apply

Colorado law in the face of the
choice-ofJaw' provision ar,rd then
refusing to enforce,the subrogation
ptovision.teasoning that it was void
as against public policy in Montana '
for allowing reimbursement of the
insurer before the insured has been
macle whole. Notably the court said,
"Therefore we conclude that application of the Colorado choice-of-law
provision violates Montana pubJic
policy, and that Montana's 'made
whole'doctrine shall be applied to
the subrogation ptovision." One
might ask whether it is application
of the choice-of-law provision or the
application of the subrogation clause
that violates pubJic poJicy. Can we
assume that the choice-of-law provision would still apply to any clause
that did not violate Montana public
,

polìcy?

Cøsarotto e. Lombardi (1994)z
Adopting Restatement (Second)

Conflict of Laws $$ 187-188 and
Making it Consistent with
Youngblood

In

1.994, the Montana Supreme

Court applied Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws $ 187 and 188
and Yoangblood

of which

to resolve the issue
in a

state's law applied

franchise contract case. Casarotto u.
Inznbardfo involved festatrrant fran^
chise dispute and the issue of legality
oF a mandatory arbitration provision

in the franchise contract. The agreement expressly provided that it "shall
be governed by and construecl in
accordance v¡ith the laws of the State

rWn,rcoun Nnw Axo RBrunNrNG MEMBERS
MqN:EäU{A!T.EIbUIåéWJEBS

JTISTICE

ALL

James David Johnson

Paul Simon

Michael I(auffman

Nathan \)Tagner

Paul Neal
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lt
of Connecticut. ." In its decision,
the court quoted Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws S 188 (1971)
in part, but it is well to quote it in

full here:
$ 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice of

Law by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties

of

the parties with respect to an
issue in contract are determined by the local law of the
state which, with tespect to
that issue, has the most signi{ìcant relationship to the transaction and the parties under
the princþles stated i" S 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see S 187), the context to
be taken into account in applying then princþles of $ 6 to
determine the law applicable to
an issue include:
(a) the place of contracling,

þ) th. place of

negotiation

of

the contract,
(c) the place

of performance,

(d) the location of the subject
m tter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence,
nattonahry, place of incorporation and place of business

of

the parties.

These contracts are to be
evaluated according to their
relative impottance with re-

þ) appJication of the law
of the chosen state would

spect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating
the contract and the place of

mental policy of the state
which has a materially

be contrary to a funda-

greate( interest than the
chosen state in the deter-

performance are in the same
state, the local law of this state
will usually be appliecl, except
as otherwise provided in $$
1.89-1.99 and 203.

mination

against public policy. The court
found Yoangblood consistent with
S 187(2) of the Restatement which
it quoted in part:
(2) the law of the state chosen
by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties
will be applied, even if the
patticular issue is one which
the parties coulcl not have resolved by an explicit provision
in therr âgreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties' choice,

of

the particular

law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by
the parties.

The court noted the language

"in the absence of an effective choice
of law" and used Youngblood to support the proposition that a choice of
law cannot be "effective" if it is

of

issue and which, under the
rule of $ 1BB, would be
the state of the applicable

The court then determined that
Montanahad a 1'mateil-¿,þ greater
interest" than Connecticut because
franchise negotiations, franchise loca-

tion, operatiorl, contract performance,
ancl residence of fianchise owners
were all in Gteat Falls, Montana.
Finally, the court concluded that the
arbitrauon clause and lack of notice
of that clause were contnary to a
fundamental public policy of the
State of Montana. Hence, Montana
law applied so that the arbitration
clause would not be enforcecl.

It

seems fair

to conclucle from

the court's reasoning that, having
concluded that there v/âs no "effective choice of law," the court used
the "most signifìcant relationship to
the transaction" test of $ 188 (2) by
applylng the {ìve factors of subsection (3). Howevet, equaþ important

What would your pract¡ce be like without MTLA?
You could be hiring experts

to help you apportion the damages

attributable to your client not wearing her seat belt when her car was hit from the rear
while she was stopped at a red light. You could be calling all your colleagues, one by one,
day after day, trying to find out if anybody had any experience with, depositions of,
or ¡nformation on the defense medical expert that is about to examine your client.
Increasing your membership level helps assure that MTLA continues its legislative work,
provides listserve access to the collective expertise of all MTLA members, and so much more

Prcn
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is the fact that the court appeared to
find that appJicatron of the Connecticut choice-ofJaw provision "would
be conttary to a fundamental policy''
of Montana v¡hich the court expressly found had a "materia)Iy
greâter interest" than Connecticut.
Hence, Ca¡arotlo seems to consider
the fìve factors for "most sþificant
relationship to the transaction" and,
separate and apart, "materially greater
interest" based in Montana's pubJic

policy involving invalidity

of

Mitcbell o. Stdte Farm (2003):
Applylng the Restatement to
aff:rlm Kemp, Yoangblood, and
the Statutory Directive for Place
u. State

Q003)31 involved ø Cahfornia auto

poìicy with no choice-of-law provision. Mitchell, a Cahforian atrending
school in Montana, was injured in an
auto accident in Montana while a
passenger in a vehicle owned by
Haas. He settled with Haas's carfier,
Fatmers Insurance Company, for the
$50,000 BI coverage limits and then
sought to stack UIM benefìts under
thc coverage for the five vehicles his
parents insured with State Farm in

California.
The State Farm policy contained
three provisions at issue, which provisions Montana had declared void as
against public policy. The provisions
were: (1) an unduly restrictive definition of an underinsured motor vehicle; (2) an offset of BI benefits
received against UIM benefits due;
and, (3) a UM/UIM anti-stacking
provision. All three provisions were
valid in California and void as against
public interest in Montana, so that

recovery hinged on which state's law
applied. The lower coutt applied the
Restatement to find California law
applied.

Having resolved Casarolto on the
of the Restatement and
Yoøngblood, the die appeared cast

Tru¡r TnnNos

,

-

AuruuN
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set ptov-ision, and

court's application that resulted in the
conclusion that California law app-lied
was erroneous, and the Suprer.ne
Court returned to the law of
Youngblood to resolve the conflict

tutional restrictions, will follow

Farrz Aøto. Ins. Co.

basis

ment (Second) Conflicts of Laws.
However, the court said the district

$ 6. Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to consti-

Performance
Mitchell

ingly, the court helcl that Montana law
applied as the law of the place where
the contraÇt was,to be performed.

oF lav¡. The court focused on the
reference in $ 188(1) above to $ 6
which provides:

some

arbiration provisions.

of

when Mitchell presented in the Montana Supreme Court. Indeed, the
court began by acknowledging that
consistency with Casarotto required
the clistrict court to apply the Restate-

â stafutory directive of its own
state on choice of law:
(2) \X/here there is no such
directive, the factors relevant
to the choice of law include. . .

Citing

court faulted
the clistrict court for not following
Montana's stâtutory ditective which
S 6(1), the

provides:

MCA S 28-3-102. What La.w.
and usage to govern interpretation.

A contract is to be interpreted
according to the law in usage
where it is to be petformed, or,
if it does not indicate a place
of perfotmance, according to
the law and usage
where it is made.

of

the place

The court then followed the I(enrp
analysis concluding that the standard
provisions such as territoriaìity indi-:
cate place of performance to be
where the claim arises and the judgment would be paid, that being Montana. The court explâined that Kernp
was still good law after adoption of
the Restatement, because $ 6(1) of
the Restatcment "requires a court to
first look to relevant stâte lâw when
determining applicable lav¡." Âccord-

Applying Montana law, the court
found the UIM defìnition, UIM off-

UIM anti-stacking

provisions all void as against public
policy.
Mitcl¡ell reinforced l{enp in the
principle that, absent a choice-of-law
provision, the Montana statute, MCA
S 28-3-102 controls the law to be
applied by specifying that "place
of performance" is determinative.

Moreover, the standatd auto insutance provisions on territoriality,
grant of coverâge, and payment of
claims indicate the place of performànce will be the state where the
auto accident claims arise.

Oberson a. Federated Mwtual Ins.
Co. (2005): Denying Application

of Michigan Law to a Michigan
Workers' Compensation Policy in
Montana32
Obersqn v/as the conseÍvâtor for
Musselman who was a Michigan
resident working for a Michigan Engineering firm in Montana when he
was catastrophicaLly injured. Federated, the work comp insurer, wanted
to subrogate against alarge but inadequate verdict Musselman won in a
Montana court. Federated filed a
subrogation action in the \X/orkers'
Compensation colut for Michigan,
and Mussêlrnan fìled a declaratory
action in Montana. Michigan allowed
such subrogation, and Montana prohibited it as against public policy. The
issue was whether Michigan law
would apply or that of Montana.
The Montana court refused to
grant comity to the decision of the
Michigan work comp court on the
ground that comity is cntirely voluntary and need not be granted when
Montana has a strong.public policy
interest in not allowing the subrogation. The court refused to adopt
$ 185 of the Restatement which
governed subrogation in work places

Pecn 25

saylng that it adopted Restatement
sections only aftet evaluating Montana
public policies and the Legislature's
statutory guidance. The court said,.
"Moreover, in choice of law cases,
this court has consistently rejected

tigid tules, favoring the modern trend
toward a more flexible approach
which permits analysis of the policies
and interests undedying the particular
issue before the court."
The court refused to apply

Michigan law citing Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution

for its guarantee of a right of full
legal redress for injuqr in ernployment. The court then cited Yoøngblood
(1,993) and Swanson (2002) as examples of cases in which court
applied Montana law to prohibit
subrogation by out-of-state insurers.
lüJ}ile Oberson ts aworkers' compensation case, it is notable because it
refused the inflexible approach of
applylng Restatement $ 185, favonng
instead an approach that would allow
consicleration of Montana public
policy. \X/e will see later that, in the
atea of auto insurance, adherence
to the Restatement would indeed
result in a rote approach that would
completeþ ignore Montana's strong
pubJic policy protecting auto insurcds.

Kilmer a. State Farm (2005)rApplyrng Mitchell to the Montana
Policy in Another State
Mitcbe ll I reaff.maíon of
Yoøngblood and Kemþ was salutary fot
claimants' lawyers. However, under
those cases, if a Montana policy is
involved in an accident in another
stâte, one might say that every silver

Jining has a dark clottd. Kilzner u. State
Farø Møtaal Aøto. Ins. (2005)33 was

litigated in the United States District
Court in Billings. Plaintifl I(ilmer, a
North Dakota resident, was rendered
accident near
quadriplegic in àn
^úto
Beach, North Dakota while insured
under a State Farm policy issued in
Montana. He sought the court's
ruling that Montana was the place

Tru¡r Tnp¡¡os - AuruuN
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of performance of

the rnsurance

some insurers to the Mitchell/Kenp

contrâct so thât he would be entitled
to Undetinsured Motorist coverage
benefits. I(lmer wanted the protection of Montana's defìnition of an
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" and
the freedom that Montana law would
provide from the policy's anti-stacking provision
I(ilmer lived on a ranch near
Beach, North Dakota, which
straddles the Montana/North Dakota
border. I(lmer introduced much
evidence that he conducted his affairs
in Montana including the facts that
he was getting medical treatment at
Sidney, had aMontana driver's license, did seasonal work in Montana,
and was conducting some of his
litigation in Montana. Accordingly,
he argued that Montana law should

to inevitably
conclude that Montana law would
apply to out-of-state policies, Insurers
began fìling actions in the courts of
the states that issued the out-of-state
policies seeking declarations that the
law of the issuing state as opposed to
Montana appliecl. The actions were
often fìled immediately after Montana
counsel advised the insurer of intention to interpret policy provisions
under Montana Iaw.
The Wamsleys, residents of
North Dakota, wete driving their
Chrysler mini-van near Bozeman,
Montana. Stanton, a Montanan, who
was intoxicated and passed out at the
wheel, crossed the center divide,

âPply.

eling behind them. The !7amsleys
ancl Stanton died from the accident.
The \X/amsleys had three cars insured
v¡ith Nodak in North Dakota, each
ptoviding $100,000 per insured in
UIM coverage. The two other cars
were garaged in North Dakota, The
company paìd a singlc limit of

Unfortunateþ for I(ilmer, the
federal court'wâs bound to follow the
Montana precedents of Mitchell and
its reliance on l{enuþ in holding that
"place of petformance" dictates the
law that applies to the auto insurance
contract. The court followed an
analysis virtuaþ identical to that of
Mìtîhell and found dispositive the
facts that the accident happened in
North Dakota and involved people
who neither lived nor worked in
Montana ñ rhú time. The court concluded that the place of petformance
was North Dakota in spite of the fact
that the plaintìff had much personal
business corìtact, medical treatment,
and some litigation in Montana.
.Wamsley

t:. Nodak (2008):
Denying Full Faith and Credit to
Notth Dakota in a Race to the
Courthouse
The cases discussed so far have
all involved Montana courts cleciding
if Montana law applied. The situation
is more compJicated where â court
in another state is intent on making
the same decision at the same time.
lVamsle-1t u. Nodak Mat. Ins. Co.
(2008)34 reflects the response of

analysis which seemed

hitting the ìØamsleys. The two cars
proceeded to hit a motor home trav-

$100,000 UIM for each death but
refused to pay the $400,000 UIM
limits available if the two other

policies were stacked.
North Dakota law does not allow
stacking. Montana counsel demanded
that the pohcies be stacked under
Montana law, and the insurer requested and ieceivçd additional time
to study the request but actually usecl
the time to prepare and file a declarztory action in North Dakota before
the plaintiffs could file in Montana.
Plaintiffs then immediateþ filecl in
Montana. The Montana District
Court refused Nodak's request for a
stay of the Montana pioceedings.
Subsequently, the court refused
Nodak's request to validate the summary judgment it received in North
Dakota under the Full Faith and
Credit clause of the constitution.

Nodak'also'argucd Mootana did not
have personal jurisdiction over it. The

Prcn

27

Montana court ruled Nodak had waived the personal
jurisdiction defense by failing to perfect it proceduraþ
On appellate review, the Montana Supreme Court
recited a careful step-by-step approach in which Restatement $ 6(1) is considered first, requiring the court to look
at the relevant state law - in this case MCA S 28-3-102.
As noted eaÃ:rcr, that statute provides a contràct is to be
interpreted according to where it is to be performed or, if
it does not indicate a place of performance, according to
the law and usage of the place where it is made. The
Nodak policies contained standard provisions nearþ identical to those in MitcbelÌ including the territoriality provision. The accident occurred ìn Montana; damages were
suffered in Montana; suit was filed against a Montana
tortfeasor in Montana; the insurer had already paicl
$200,000 in UIM claims in Montana. Hence, the court
followed Mitchell Q003), in ruling that the place of performaflce, pursuaflt to MCA S 28-3-102, was where an jnsured is entitled to receive benefìts, has incurred accident
related expenses, or is entitled to judgment. Hence, the
IVanslel decision was entirely consistent with Mitchell/Kerrp.
However, the Montana Supreme Court had to deal
with the earþ conflicting judgment won in North Dakota
in the race to the courthouse. The North Dakota Supreme
Court in the interim had upheld that judgment holding
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Notable also was the sharp dissent of Justices Gray,
ìØatner, and Judge $íayne Phllips from the majority's
refusal to accord full faith and credit and from the {ìnding
that Montana prevails under conflicts-of-law pnnciples.
They contended that MCA S 28-3-102, read the way the
court was reading it, ultimateþ meànt that, whenever an
acciclent happened in Montana, Montana law would be
applied. In hindsight, the dissent sþaled a gathering
stofm.

FORENS¡C ENGINEERS

Offering

that North Dakota law appliecl and did not allow stackCourt held that
the Montana District Court did not err in refusing to give
full faith and credit to the North Dakota Supreme Court
decision reasoning that a court need not accord full faith
and credit if the action of the foreign court would "impermissibly interfere with Montana litigation." The court
noted the "back door" tactic used by the insurer of requesting time to study the mâtter whle racing to the
North Dakota courts to avoid having the matter Jitigated
in Montana and concluded it was ân attempt to impose
"interlocutory control" over State District Courts in
Montana. The court determined that the North Dakota
clecision could be treated as an "advisoty opinion." Note
however, that the Montana court refused the argument
that Full Faith and Creclit should not be honored where
the Noth Dakota judgment would violate public policy
of the State of Montana saying that is not ân adequate
ground for refusal. The coutt said, "[A]s a general rule,
a judgment must be afforded full faith and credit regardless of how greatly it offends the public polìcy of
ing.3s Nevertheless, the Montana Supreme

(cell)
g.

net

Modroo ú. Ndtionu)ide (2005)z Eroding Montana's
"Materially Greater Interest" in Policies Covering
Auto Accidents in This State
In Mo'droo u. Nationwide Mataal Fire Ins. Co. Q00B),37
Justice Leaphart, writing for the majority, focused his
Restatement analysis in that conflicts-of-law case to consideration of v¡hich state has the "materially greater interest" in the subject matter and issues. In Moodro, University
of Montana student, Mamie l{ardy, a resident of Ohio,
died a couple days after being injured âs â passenger in a
single-vehicle accident in Mineral County, Montana. On
behalf of the driver, Allstate paid $50,000 limits of BI
coverage without a release, and Mamie's mother, Mary
Modtoo, as personal representative of her estate, sued
the tortfeasor and three Nationwide insurers that provided
the family UIM coverage under farm business and personal auto policies in Ohio. Nationwide's personal auto
policy (ultimately at issue in the case) insured two vehicles
for UIM coverage of $300,000 per person. The UIM
coverage, which contained an offset for any amounts paid

:

ì
:
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by Jiable parties and an anti-stacking
provision, contained a choice-of-lav¡
provision that Ohio law would govern interpretation.
Modroo sought to stack the [mits
of the Ohio personal auto policy
UTM as a result of Mamie's injury
ancl death. The issue was whcthcr the

court should apply Ohio läw that
would enforce provisions barring
stacking and allowing offsets against
the UIM coverage, which provisions
would each violate Montana public
policy. On its facts, Moodro was the
Yoangblood case, and Yoøngblood was

still good law, so one could have
predicted that the court would hold
that Montana law applied. Both cases
had choice-of-law ptovisions, which,
if applied, would result in violation
of Montana public policy. For that
reason, the court could fìnd that the
policy contained no "effective"
choice-of-law provision and fìnd that
Montana had a "mateitally greater
interest" that v/ould allow its public
policy to ovcrridc the offending
insurance provisions.
On appeal, howevet, the court
held that, by the terms of the policy,
the law oF Montana, where the acciclent occurred, governed the compensatory damages available in tott under
the UIM coverage, whjle the law of
Ohio governed the interpretatìon of
the policy contract. The court reasoned that the petsonal auto policy
UIM coverage said it would pay compensatory damages that you ". . àte
legally entitled to recover from the
owner or dfiver" of an underinsured
motor vehicle "under the tort law of
the state where the motor vehicle
accident occurred." The policy also
provided that the "contract law
of the State of Ohio governs the
interpretation of this contract." The
Montana Supreme Court said these
differing provisions âre not in
conflict and produce no ambþity.
The coutt then held that the
stacking and offset provisions of the
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of tort compensation, but matters of coverage
govcrned by the contrâct ancl contract
law Hence, Ohio law barring stacking and allowing the offsets is properþ applied. Howevet, this raised the
issue whether it is etror to apply
Ohio law which allows offsets and
precludes stacking which would violate Montana public policy. Rccall
that the Montana court had refused
to enforce an Oregon choice-of-law
provision in YoøngbÌood in 1.993 and
held in Cavrotto u. Lnnbardi in 1994,
that a Connecticut choice-ofJaw
provision could not be an "effective
choice-of-law provision" within the
meaning of the Rcstatement (Second)
poJicy are not matters

of Conflicts S 188(2), if it resulted in
violation of Montana public policy.
in Swanson n 2002, the court
refused to enforce a Colorado choice-

Â.ncl

oflaw provision

because

it would

rcsult in grantìng the auto insurer
subrogation which was against public
policy in Montana. Finally, uncler
the Restatement, if Montanahas a
"material)y greater interest in the
determination of the issue" it can
override thc law of the stâte chosen
by the parties to govern their contract.
The court noted that Moodrohad
not appealed the District Court's
decision that Ohio law applied to the
auto poJicy but had instead simply
argued that the policy's laneuage
should not be enforced because it
violated Montana law, an argument
consistent with Yoøngblood, Casarotto,
and Swanson The court oprned that
its decision in Srvanson Q002) may
have confuscd thc situation and attempted to clarify by reference to the
Restatement $ 1 87(2)þ):
Stated differently, we will not
apply the law of the state chosen by the parties if three

factors are met: (1) if, but for
the choicc-ofJaw provision,
Montana law would apply undet $ 1BB of the Restatement;

if

Montana has a mateitaTly
in the particular ìssue than the state choòen
by the parties; and (3) if applying the state law chosen by thc
(2)

greater interest

partìes would contravene â
fundamental policy of Montana.

to fâctor (1), the
court turned to $ 188 which the court
said "governs situations where the
contracting'parties fail to select an
NØith regard

effective choice

of

law."

(1) The rights'and duties of
the parties with respect to an
issue in contract are determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to
that issue, has the most sþnifìcant relationship to the tfansaction and the parties under
the principles stated in $
6

fChoice-of-law Principles].

Recall that $ 6 refers the court to

the state's stâtutory directive which,

in Montana, is the previously quoted
MC,q. S 28-3-1.02 providing that the
"contlact is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place
where it is to be pedotmed . . . ."
The court compâred the facts in
Mitchel/ with those of Moodro, the
Moodro facts being:

Policy promise to pày damages
"under the tort law of the state
where the motot vehicle accideni occurred..."
Insured attending UM in
Montana
Insured working and living in
Montana
Insured paid taxes in Montana
Insured ìncutred, medical
expenses in Montana
Insured settled with. tortfeasor
giving risc to UIM claim in

Montana

,

Judgment will,be rendeted and
paid in Montana
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Following Mitchell, the court
concluded that, as the place of performance, Montana law would apply
but for the choice-ofJaw provision.
However, the court pointed out that
the poJicy in Mitchell contained no
choice-of-law provision while the
personal auto poJicy in Moodro dtd.
The court then turned attention
to the second inquiry, whether Montana had a "materialTy greater interesC' than Ohio, the pre-condition to
the third inquiry of whether applyrng
Ohio law would violate Montana

public poticy.
NØhether Montana had a maten-

ally greatet interest required analysis
under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws $ 1.87 and 188 (1971).
Restatement S 187(2) sets forth the
factors to considet and weigh:
(a) the place

of contracting,

þ) th" place of

negotiation

of

the

contract,
(c) the place

of performance,

(d) the location of the subjcct
mattef of the contract,
(e) the domicile, residence, nation-

ahq, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.

Analyzing under those factors,
the court found as follows:

formance. The Restatement
gives this weight because such
a state "has an obvious interest

The policy was purchased
from an agency in Ohio, so
Ohio is place of contracting.
Moodro is an Ohio resident
and Nationwide is headquartered in Ohio. The court
pointed out that the Restate-

in the nature of performance
and in the party who is to perform" However the Restate-

ment comments say these contacts "bear litde significance
when considered separately,
but gain importance based on
their relationship to the con-

ment wafns that place of
performance has little weight
when it was unknown at the
time of contracting. The court
noted that Montana did not
become the place of performance until the accident occurred and accorded it little

weight.

tract issue involved and the

other contacts."
Location of the subject màtter
bears no significance because
there is no specific physical
thing or locahzed risk involved.

Any negotiations occurred in
Ohio. The Restatement accords weight to negotiations.
However, the court noted that
"insurance policies are not the
result of negotiating andbar
gaining by the parties," but are
adhesion contrâcts, so the
court accorded little weight to
the negotiation factor.
Montana, as previously discussed, was the place of per-

Considering those contacts and
the weight accorded each, the court
found that Montana did not have a
mateitally gre ter interest than Ohio
that would wøtrant applying Montana
law over Ohio's. Hence, Montana
public policy would not override

Ohio

law.

There
r to be two signifi^ppe
cant errors in the reasoning here.
First, the assertion that the Montana
court would give little weight to place

of performance

(À4ontana) because

it

was unknown at the time of contracting is arguably error. Place of performânce was known at the time of
contracting, because the insurer
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agreed that, under the terdtoriality
provision, "the United States of
America, its territory and posses-

sions" including Puerto Rico or
Canada are the places it would perform. In essence, the insurer agreed
Montana (and every other state in the
union) would be the place of pedormance. Furthetmore, Montana was a
place of performance even before the
accident occurrecl as were New York
and Florida. Moreover, where the
insurer has agreed to cover accidents
in all 50 states and the territories and
possessions of the United States,
what difference cloes it make which
statc's law applics?
Second, the rote application of
the Restatement S 187(2) princþles
takes no account of a state's strong
public policy prorlouncements, and
this decision was a major deviation
from Montana judsptudence. Moodro
suddenly removed any test that would
allow consideration of Montana's
strong public policy pronouncement

on validity

of

auto insurance policy

provisions. Under Moodro, for instânce, there would be no way to
factor'tn Montanâ's abhortence of a
famtly or household exclusion that
would prerrent a chjld from: suing her
negligent parent for rendering her
paraplegic in an auto acciclent. Montana,

in

Tran¡america u. Ro/e (1983)

held such a provision to be void as
against public policy. ,{.s insurance
scholar, Professor l(en Abraham,
has said:

Automobile insutance coverage issues have so predomi-

n^nt
impact on orclinary
^n
individuals and account for so
large a portion of the personal
injury law suits brought in the
United States that the fìeld is
necessarily special. The result
is that consumer-protection
and victim-protection concerns often opefate more
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strongly in this area of

a long

insurance than ottiers.

ers

o[
Accordingly, justìce Cotter vigorously dissented to the maiority's determination of " materially greàter
interest," and Justice Nelson concurred in that dissent. Justice Cotter

followed the appJication of $ 188(2)
of Moodro to fìnd that Nevada's
interest outweighecl Montana's. Ironically, the court made special note of
the fact that the insureds were only
visiting Montana, a fact present in
virtually every previous case that had
gone the other way.
Baù>an Barnes had two Nevacla
auto insurance poJicies with Progressive. She ancl her daughter were visiting in Montana when the daughter
suffered injuries while a passenger in
an uninsured auto in Lake County,
Montana. She incurred $34,000 in
medical expenses. Ba*¡ara's policies
each had $25,000 UM limits and
contained anti-stacking clauses and
a choicc-of-law provision requìring
appJication of Nev¿da law to resolve
polìc¡t disputeq, progiessive eventu- l

tute the materially greatcr intcrest
determination. The court should
have detetmined "materiaþ greater
interesC' separate and apan from the
S 1BB(2) analysis which would give

Montana's important pubJic policy
protectìng UIM coverage much
greatef weight. Justice Cotter said

that the coutt has been conflating the
two tests in error thereby denying
Montana the materially greater interest that should come from the pubJic
policy protections it has developed

around UIM coverage.
This most important dissent sets
out the bad flaw in thc court's rcccnt

Iocation of subject of the contract,
and domicile or residence, do not
allow any consideration of the fact
that Montanahas a strong tradition
of pubJic policy protections that
apply to auto policy provisions.
Conflating the $ 188(2) factors to
consdrute "materially greate.r interest"
is error that explains the apparent
about-face that has caused the coutt,
to suddenly decide that Montana has
no materially greater interest in interpreting' out-of-state auto policies after

such policies,the protections
out well-developed public poticy.

Tenas a. Progressioe (2008):
Ignoring Montana's Materially
Greater Interest in its Public
Policy Protections Where There
is a Choice-of-Law Ptovision
In the case of Tenas u. Progressiue
Preferced Ins.38 in 2008, Justice Morris

argued and pointed out substantial
authority for the position that "the
Restatement itself . . . posits the 'materially greàter interest' inquiry as
separate and apart From the S 1 88(2)
factors anaþsis. The majority, she
said, conflated the two anaþses allowing the $ 188(2) anaþsis to consti-

and ongoing treaiment of out-of-state
auto policics. Thc court has now
adopted the Restatement and is applying the S 188(2) factors. But the factors, i.e., place of contracting, place
of negotiation, place of performance,

histoty of providing consum-

of

'

nlly p¿id a single limit o'f U-M and
refused the demand to stack the
second UM coverage.
Progressive filed an action in
Nevada to declare that the policy
prohibited stacking. A vreek later,
Tenas filed suit in State Districr
Court in Montana seeking a detetmination that the UM covcragc could bc
stacked. Progressive moved to dismiss the Montana action based on

comity and "priority jurisdiction."
Judge Christopher asscrted that thc
issue was choice-oflaw and not jurisdiction and denied Progressive's motion to dismiss. Christopher found
that applicarion of Nevada law would
, violate Montana public policy against
anti-stacking provisions ancl granted

P¡aB 31

Tenas summary judgment and

attorney fees under Brewer Q003).
Progressive appealed.
On appeal, the court said, "The

District Court properþ subordinated
the clisctetionary principle of comity
to the important public poìicy ìmplications." A court need not honor
comity to relinquish jurisdiction
where the result will violate public
policy. Also, no Montana court has
adopted the general doctrine of
"priority jurisdiction." Agri-IVut
(1,997)3' was natrowly limited to the
federal law surrounding Indian tribal
jurisdiction.
Howevet, the court said the
District Court improperþ applied
Montana law to a Nevada policy
because, under conflicts of law
pdnciples, Nevada has a "materially
greater interest" in the matter than
Montana. The court cited CasaroÍto
(1994) as stating the most current
rulc where the contract contains a
choice of law provision. Under
Casarolto, the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws S 187(2) (1,971)
governs. That section provides:
(2) The law of the state chosen
by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties
will be applied, even if the
particular issue is one which
the patties could not have resolved by an explicit provision
in theit agreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to
the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or

þ)

application

of

the law

of

the chosen state would be
contfary to a fundamental

policy

of

â state which has a

materially gre ter interest
than the chosen state in the
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determination of the particular issue and which, undet the rule of $ 188, would
be the state of the applicable law in the absence of
an effective choice of law
by the parties.

No one

asserted that (a) appJied.

The coutt must look next to $ 188
which refers to $ 6 of the Restatement. Section 6, in return, provides
that"fa] court, subject to constitutional testrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of lav¡." If there is no such
directive, $ 6(2) "provides seven
principles relevant to choice of
appJicable law, and S 1BB(2) provides
factors to aid in thât consideranon.
Applying Montana's starute, $ 283-1.02, MCÁ., the court held that
Montana is the place of performance
because:

(1) The poJicy didn't limit
place of performance.
(2) The accident occurred in

Montana.
(3) The medical experìses were
incurred in Montana.
(4) Damages in Montana.
(5) Torteasor resided in
Montana.
(6) Initial claim payments
made in Montana.
However, the court then determined that Montana does not have
a"mateinlfy gte ter interest" than
Nevada, the chosen state under the
S 187(2) factors:

(a) the place
(b)

th.

place

of contracting,

of negotiation

of the contract,
(c) the place

of performance,

(d) the location of the subject
m^lter of the contract
(e) the domicile, residence,

nationalit¡ place of incotporation and place of business of

tle

parties.

Consequently, the court said the
District Court improperþ gave sum-

mary judgment by applylng Montana
stacking law, and improperþ awarded
attorfley fees, since summary juclgment for Tenas was improper.
Justices Cotter and Nelson in
their concurrences both referred to
theit previous dissents in Moodro to
the use of $ 1BB(2) factors to determine "materiøllv greater interest" but
did not, in fact, file dissents in Tenas.
Again, the sole use of the Restatement factors from $ 187(2) to determine whethe r Montana had a
"mateitally gre tü interest" allowed
no consideration for Montana's consumer protections in the auto insurance policy provisions.
Justice Leaphart simply concurred in the decision. Justice Rice

concurred believing that the court
should have gnnted comity to Nevada, andJustices Gray and l(/arner
joined in that concurrence.

Twcker e. Fd,rmers Ins. Exchange
(2009): Ignoring Montana Public
Policy in Policies Without Choiceof-Law Provisions
Tucker u. Farmers Ins. Exchangea\ in
2009, involved an Idaho policy with

no choice-of-law ptovision. Justice
Morris summarily followed the
Moodro application of the 188(2)
factors to find that Montana had no
mateitdly greàter interest than Idaho.
In Tøc,ker, an l.l-year-old Idaho resident, Cady Tucker, was killed on
Montana Highway 83 at Seeley Lake
while riding þ a vehicle owned and
operated by Cushman, aMontanan.
Montana resident, Janie McNait negligently crossed the centedine causing
the collision. Cady Tucker died aftcr
Iiving an appreciable length of time.
Cady Tucker v/as an insured on
the Underinsured Motorist covetage
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on her Idaho stepfather's $1,000,000
umbrella policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE). Issues cleveloped around potentìal offsets to the
UIM coverage and whether emotional
disttess of Tucker's mother consti-

tuted compensable "bodily injury''
under the FIE UIM coverage. Ultimately, the case was tried agarnst FIE
in Missoula Montana whete a jury
awarded $516,000.
Ironically, on appeal in Tøcker,
it was the insurer that argued that
Montana law applied, and the
insured's personal representatives
who argued Idaho law applied. The
Montana Supreme Court said, in
Nationuide Mat. Fire Ins.

Moodro

a.

(2008),

it had adopted the "most

Co.

signi{ìcant relationship" approach

from Restatement (Second) Conflict
of Law. (Ihe FIE umbrella policy at
issue did not specifii choice of law)
The court noted, ". . .that the poJicies
had been issued in Idaho, to Idaho

residents, providing coverage to
Idaho vehicles." The court concedéd
that Montana was the place of performance but indicated that "place

of performance

bears little weight in
choice-of-law determinations, however, when the place of performance
is uncertain or unknown at the time
of conffacting" noting that Montana
drd not become the place of performance until the accident. (Author's
note: this has been true in virtually all
of the prior decisions.) The court
asserted that "Montana's interest in
this dispute derives solely from its
stâtus as the place of performance"
which fact doesn't cre te materially
^
gre ter interest over Idaho. ,A.s the

couft said, 'qWe ate left to resolve a
clispute that centers on the interpretation of the Idaho insurance policies
issued to Idaho residents by corporations doing business in Idaho." This
time, Justices Cotter and Nelson

concutred making no mention

of

their Moodro dissents. Justice I ,eaphan
'Warner
wrote
concurred, and Justice
a special concurrence explaining why
judicial estopþel wotid not apply to the
positìons the plaintiff took in Idaho
and Montana.
Twcker, then is a classic case of an
out-of-statê poJicy with no choice-oflaw provision appþing to an accident
and injuries in Montana. Considering
Ke nrp, Yoø ngb /o o d, S wan s o n, IYazz s /e1,

it is shocking to
court now finding no material

Kilmer, anà Mitchell,
see the

interest where Montana is the place
of performance and thete is no

choice-oflaw desþation in the
poJicy. The decision cannot be made
consistent with prior decisions and
the conflation.of the Restatement
S 187(2) factors with "materiaþ
gÍeàter interesC' is like a c r careening through the cases and sending

them sprawling. One might ask
whether there is ânything left of
Yoangblood.
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CONCLUSION
Reviewing the conflicts of law
in Montana in chronological
order, as we have here, reveals that
the Montana Supreme Court followed
a clear and predictable set of princþles in dealing with the issue of
what law applies to the out-of-state
auto policy involved in an accident in
Montana for almost thirty yeats from
cases

I{erzq

If

in 1979 until

Moodro

in 2008.

the policy contained no choice-

oflaw provision, MCÄ

S 28-3-1.02

controlled, and the court looked to
place of petformance as in the l{enuþ,
Mitchell, and Kilmer cases. Anaþsis of
the standard policies' basic insuring
âgreement, territoriality provision and
promise to pây judgments where
rendered determined place of performance for the court. If the poJicy
contained a choice-of-law provision,

the court would enforce it as written
unless it would result in violation of
Montana's public policy as the court
determined rn Yoangblood, Casarotto,
and

Swaruson.

The court 'n Casarolto adopted

SS 187 and 188 of the Restatement
and made thosc seclions consistent

with its prior clecision in Youngblood lry
finding that a choice-oflaw provision
that violates pubJic poJicy is not an
"effective choice of la#' under those
sections. Mitcltell too relied on the
Restatement, Kerzrp, and Yowrugblood.
Oberson, a work comp insurance case,
cited Yoanþlood and Swanson for their

refusal to enforce subrogation by
out-of-state insurets in violation of
Montana pubìic policy. The Montana
Federal District Court in Kilmer sammarily ruled that Mitchell anå Kerztp

dictated that Montana law could not
apply where a Montana policy was
involved in a North Dakota auto
accident, North Dakota being the
place of performance. As late as
2008, the court in IYamsle1 carefully
follov¡ed Restatement $ 6(1) in its
requirement that the court look to'
the relevant statute and applied MCA
S 28-3-102 and the MitcheÌÌ and Kemp

Tnr¡r Tns,N¡s

to find that Montana law
appJied to a North Dakota poJicy in
an accident in Bozeman.
The dissent's criticism in ll/amsle1
of the extent to which the coutt was
finding Montana law to apply should
be taken with a grain of salt. Remember that every decision in which the
court applied Montana law ovet a
choice of law provision calling for
another statet law to apply involved

nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties.
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insurance provision whose
^:uto
application would cleaily violate
Montana's strong public poJicy. Each
of the cases has involved an insurer
attempting to enforce one of three
provisions the Montana Supreme
an

Court has repeatedly found repugnant as against pubJic interest: (1) a
provision allowing the insurer to
subrogate against the recovery of its
insurecl who has not been made
whole, a practce that this coutt has
simply not allowed; (2) placing in an
insurance policy a provision that
defeats coverage for which the insured has paid valuable consideration;
or, (3) allowing the insurer to reduce
UM or UIM coverage by amounts
tecovered by the injured insured from
the tortfeasor's boclily injury coverage.
InexpJicably, in Moodro and Tenas
in 2008, the court became mired in
what it had previously described as
inflexible approaches of the Restatement and to determine whether
Montana laad a "materially greater
interest" that would allow it to refuse

application of a provision that would
violate a fundamental public policy
of Montana. The court began rote
application of the S 187(2) factors as
the only âpparent factors in determin'tng
" materially greater interest."
(a) the place

þ)

of contracting,

of negotiation
of the contract,

the place

(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject
matter of the contract,
(e) the domicile, residence,

Those factors completely remove

from consideration Montana's mateitgreater interest by reason of its
strong pubJic policy protections for
consumefs of auto insurance, The
court does this by discounting place
of performance on the ground that it
is not k¡own at the time of contracting and is only apparent after the
accident happened, dubious assettions in light of the insurer's promise

aþ

to perform in all fìfty states. Furthermore, the coutt simply is not talking
about its strong public policies in
place fot protection of auto insuraflce consumefs.
Perhaps most stunning is the
court's application of this process in
Tacker in 2009, a case in which the

policy contained no choice-oflaw
provision. Application of the Restatement there previously dictated looking to our state's statutory directive,
MC,A. S 28-3-1.02, which would mean
âpplylng the place

of

petformance

standard. The coutt has never overtutned Kenþ, Mitchell, or Kilner.Vlhy
would it \>e analyzing "materially
gre ter interest" in a case where there

is no choice of law provision?
The Montana Supreme Court has
a tradition of protecring auto policy
insureds by cleaily identifying policy
provisions that are repugnant âs
against public policy. The end result

of

the Moodro, Tenas, and Tøcker cases
in the last two years is a confused

abandonment of Montana's materiah
greàter interest in its public policy
pfotection. When an insurer promises

of fifty states,
no pa:ttcular interest in what

to perform in any one

it

has

state's law applies. However, when an
accident causes people to be injured
or killed in Montana, this state has a

materially gneater interest in whether
policy provisions deemed void as
repugnant to public poticy deprive
the insureds of their coverage. This

PecB 35

intetest needs to be inserted back into
the decisions and not "conflated"
into a reversal of thitty years of wellreasoned precedent without exptessly
overruling that precedent. Until 2008,
Montana law has been quite clear in
the area of law applicable to out-ofstate poJicies. Ignoring the principles
established in such cases as Kertp,
Yoanþlood, Casarotto, and Mitchell

inffoduces an unpredictability in the
decisions. This is an opportunity for
counsel in the next case to claúfy for
the court the wisdom in the line of
cases from 1.979 to 2007 andpersuade the court of the error of the
last two years of þoring Montana's
materially greater interest in its public
policy protections for consumers of
auto insurance.
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lnsurance lndustry Profits Through the Roof! The property/casualty insurance industry is systematically
overcharging consumers leading to record prof¡ts, according to the Consumer Federation of America (eFA)
lnsurer overcharges over the last four years amount to an average of $870 per household. Said J. Robert
Hunter, the Director of lnsurance for CFA:
A major reason why insurers have repor.ted record-high prof¡ts and low losses in recent years ¡s that
they have been methodically overcharging consumers, cutting back on coverage, underpaying claims,
and getting taxpayers to pick up some of the tab for risks the insurers should cover.
Source: J. Robert Hunter, Property/Casualty lnsurance ln 2008: Overpriced lnsurance and Underpaid Claims Result in Unjustified
Profits, Padded Reserues, and Excessive Capitalization, Consumer Federation of America, January 10, 2008; www.consumerted.org/pdfs/
2008lnsurance-White_Paper.pdÍ , From Center For Justice and Democracy - http://centerjd.org/archives/spotlight/
S OJ
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"Representaliue gouernment and

trial bljary are

the heart and lungs

of

tiberfr.

lYithoat them we haue no otherfortfication against beingridden like borses,
fleeæd like sheep, worked like cattle, andfed and clothed like swine and hoands."
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John Adams
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